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According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, it is the dutv of a railroad company to heat its cars
in cold weather, in order to provide proper accomCarriers,
Negligence,
modations for its passengers; and therefore it is
Failure of
not necessary for a plaintiff, in order to recover
Railroad
Company
to heat Cars

railroad
Ry. Co.
The
decided

for injuries due to the coldness of the cars, to
allege and prove a universal custom
on the part of

companies to warm their. cars: Ft. Woj-th & D. C.
v. Hatt, 34 S. V. Rep. 677.
Queen's Bench Division of England has recently
that a regulation of.a railway company, that "each
passenger shall .....
when required so to do
Regulations either deliver up his ticket or pay
the fare legally
demandable for the distance traveled over by such passenger,
enforceable by a penalty, is reasonable; and that a passenger
who pays his fare and receives a ticket, and loses it through
accident, so that he cannot deliver it when required, but refuses
to pay the fare again, is liable to the penalty Ha'wks v.
Bridgman, [i896] I Q. B. 253 ; and moreover, that a regulation which provides that each passenger shall show his ticket
(if any) when required so to do to the conductor or any duly
authorized servant of the company, enforceable by a penalty,
is also reasonable; and that if a passenger who has paid his
fare and received a ticket refuses to show it when properly
required, he is liable: Lowe v. Volp, [1896] i Q. B. 256.
The regulation of a railroad company that a commutation
ticket shall be surrendered by the passenger to the conductor
Surrender on the last trip taken during the period for which
of Ticket
it is issued, is a reasonable regulation of the companv in the conduct of its business as a common carrier of
passengers; and if this regulation is indorsed on the ticket.
and a passenger who holds such a ticket fails or reftes to
314
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surrender it on his last trip, or pay his fare to the conductor
according to the legally established rates of the company, he
can be ejected from the car: Rogers v. Atlantic Cit , R. R. Co.,
(Supreme Court of LNew Jersey,) 34 Atl. Rep. i i.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has refused to adopt the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of
Constitutional O'-eil v. State, 58 Vt. 140, (which the Supreme
Law,
Cruel and

Unusual
Punishment

Court of the United States shirked so neatly in

O'Vei/ v. Vermnont, 144 U. S. 323.) in regard to
the infliction of cumulative fines for the violation

of a penal statute. In the case before it, State v. Wlhitaker, 19
So. Rep. .457, the record disclosed that the relators had
been committed to prison for a period of two thousand one
hundred and sixty days in default of the payment of fines
aggregating seven hundred and twenty dollars for each, and
the costs of prosecution, for the violation of a city ordinance ;
and that upon what was substantially one complaint they had
been found guilty of seventy-two distinct violations of an
ordinance within one hour and forty minutes, each of these
offences succeeding the other, only a minute and a half intervening between the commission of any two of them. These
facts were held to show that the penalty inflicted was an
unusual and unreasonable punishment in the sense of the
constitutional prohibition.
There is but one exception to be taken to the language
used by the court in this case, and that is when it says that
the severity and unusualness of the punishment is even more
apparent than in the O'Neil case. In this, as has been stated,
the offences of which the relators were convicted were seventytwo. the fines and costs something over $72o, and the days of
imprisonment 216o, while in the O'Neil case the number of
distinct offences of which O'Neil was found guilty was three
hundred and seven, the fines and costs $6638.72, and the days
of imprisonment 19,914, br over fifty-four years. It would
be harder to imagine a grosser instance of cruel and unusual
punishment. But that case has already been sufficiently criticized in this magazine: 31 A.%i. L. REG., N. S. 618.
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The Supreme Court of the United States, by a bare
majority, has decided that the Act of Congress of February
Incriminating
Testimony

I I, 1893, which provides that no person shall be
excused from attending and testifying . . . before

the Interstate Commerce Commission, .

.

. on the ground or

for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but that no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or- on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise,
before said Commission; is not in conflict with the Fifth
Amendment, which declares that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, since the
Act completely shields the witness against an), criminal prosecution which may be aided, directly or indirectly, by his testimony, and in effect operates as a pardon for the offence to
which it relates: that the fact that the pardoning power is
vested in the President does not prevent Congress from granting amnesty, either before legal proceedings are taken, during
their pendency, or after conviction and judgment: that the
constitutional privilege of refusing to give self-incriminating
testimony was not intended to shield the witness from the
personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to his case, but only
from actual prosecution and punishment that the protection
afforded by the Act extends to any possible prosecution in the
State courts, as well as in the Federal courts : that even if there
is a bare possibility that by reason of his enforced disclosures,
the witness may be prosecuted in a State court, the danger is
so remote and improbable, and of so unsubstantial a character,
that it is not within the contemplation of the constitutional
immunity, and that the fact that the witness may be prosecuted, and put to the annoyance and expense of pleading his
Constitutional privilege by way of confession and avoidance, is
a detriment which the law does not recognize, and to which
the Constitutional provision does not extend: Brozn v. Walkcr,
16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, affirming 70 Fed. Rep. 46.
Mr. Justice Field dissented, on the grounds that the Fifth
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Amendment affords absolute protection to an), witness who
desirei to avail himself of his privilege, not only from giving
evidence which might lead to his prosecution, but from giving
such as would expose him to disgrace and infamy; and that
the granting of a pardon is vested in the -president alone, and
cannot be exercised by congress. Mr. Justice Shiras, Mr.
Justice Gray, and Mr. Justice White also dissented, on the
grounds that the Act of February I 1, 1893, infringes the Fifth
Amendment, not only by subjecting the witness to the hazard
of a prosecution for an act concerning which he is compelled
to testify, but also by exposing him to the danger of a charge
of peijury in giving such testimony, which could never have
becn brought against him if the privilege of silence were not
taken away ; that Congress cannot grant immunity from prosecution in the State courts for an offense against the State,
though that offense be disclosed by self-incriminating testimony, given as required by this Act in a tribunal of the United
States and that the probability that a witness may be prosecuted in a State court for an offense thus disclosed is not so
remote or fanciful as to warrant the court in disregarding it.

It has been lately held by the Supreme Court of Florida,
that though a witness may in general refuse to answer a
contempt,
Refusal of
Witnessto
Answer

Incriminating
Question

on Cross.
Examination

question that tends to incriminate him, yet, if he,
being fully aware of his rights, consents to testify

about the very matter that may criminate him,

without claiming his privilege, he must submit to
a full, legitimate cross-examination in reference
thereto ; and if he refuses to answer incriminating

questions put to him on cross-examination, he is guilty of
contempt: Ezparte Senior, 19 So. Rep. 652.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, a court which has committed an attorney
to prison for contempt cannot require him to
Habeas
Corpus,
purge himself of the contempt as a condition of
Effect
permitting him to practice before it, when he has
been released on bail in habeas corpus proceedings to review

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

the commitment, and such proceedings are still pending in.
another court : Exparit" Kearb', 34 S. W. Rep. 962.
It has been recently held by the Circuit Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, that under the Act of Congress
of 1874, which limits the right of copyright to
Copyright,
such cuts and prints as are connected with the fine
Cuts in
Trade
arts, there can be no copyright on cuts contained
Catalogue
in a trade catalogue, and not offered
for copyright
or to the public as works of fine art: J. L. Jlott Ironz Mcrwks v.
Co'w, 72 Fed. Rep. 168.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, the service of a summons in an action against
Corporations, a foreign corporation, on an officer thereof who is
Suit
also the attorney in fact of the plaintiff for the
Against,
Service of

Writ

coimencement and prosecution of the action, is
invalid, and confers no jurisdiction : Gcorgc v.

American Gining Co., 24 S. E. Rep. 41.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently reasserted its
former ruling that the burden of proving the insanity of a
person accused of crime rests on the defence:
Criminal
Keener v. State, 24 S. E. Rep. 28.
Law,
This is directly opposed to the recent ruling of
Insanity
Defence,

Burden of
Proof

the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Davis v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.
353.

See 35 A.i. L. REG. N. S. 94.

Judge Rose, of the High Court of Justice of the Province
of Ontario, has lately defined the facts necessary to constitute
an arrest, in Fors pth v. Godn, 32 Can. L. J. 288.
What

Constitutes an The plaintiff and the defendant had a disagreeArrest
ment, and the defendant telephoned for

a policeman, who soon came, and said to the defendant, " Is this the
man ?" After learning both sides of the dispute, he said to.
the plaintiff, " You will have to come along with me to the
police station." No other words were used, and no resistance
made. Plaintiff, defendant and policeman walked to the sta-
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tion together, and there talked the matter over with the chief.
No information was laid, and the plaintiff was not detained
further. The policeman swore that he did not arrest the
plaintiff. But the judge ruled that the fact of arrest is a question of law, and that if an officer, known to be such, takes
charge of a man, and the man reasonably thinks from the conduct of the officer that he is' under arrest, this constitutes an
arrest.
A piece of ground bounded on one side by a hoarding, and
on two other sides by stays which supported the hoarding, has
been lately held to be a "place " within the
Betting,
'Place"
meaning of the statute of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119,
which imposes a penalty upon an), person, "who, being the
owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place,
or a person using the same," shall use it for the purposes of
betting : Liddell v. Lofthousc, (Queen's Bench Division,) I896]
i Q. B. 295.

in Andrews v. Jfockford, [1896] I Q. B. 372, the Court of
Appeals has decided, distinguishing Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H.
Deceit,
False

RepresentaIn
tion In

Prospectus,
Liability to
Purchaser
of Shares

L. 377, (1873,) that when the object with which

the prospectus of a company is issued is not
merely to induce an application for an allotment
of shares, but also to induce persons to whom it
is sent to buy shares in the market, its function is
not exhausted when the stock of the company has

been allotted, and the person who issues the prospectus is
responsible for a false representation contained in it, and
known to him at the time to be false, to any person to whom
the prospectus has been sent, who is thereby induced to buy
shares and sustains a loss in consequdnce thereof; and further,
that when a person who has issued the prospectus of a coinpany. containing a representation known to him at the time to
be false, subsequently causes to be published a false representation to the same effect as that in the prospectus, with the
direct intent of inducing persons to purchase shares in the company, he is responsible for the consequences to any one who,
having recei%ed a prospectus, purchases shares on the faith of
the false representation so published, and thereby suffers loss.
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The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently laid
down some general rules in relation to the use of the ballots
as evidence in an election contest, which present
Election,
Contest,
the law in that regard in a very terse and lucid
Ballots as

Evidence
form. It holds (i) That one who has received a
certificate of election to office is not estopped in case of contest, from going behind the returns from ballot boxes which
were counted without objection by either party, and'which
formed the basis of the certificate ; (2) That in an election contest, the ballots of a certain box, which had been opened
before a legislative committee after the election, are admissible
when it appears that the opportunity for the ballots to have
been tampered with was a mere possibility : and (3) That
the fact that a discrepancy exists between the returns of
the votes counted from that ballot box and a recount
made by the court in an election contest does not indicate that there was any alteration in the ballots after being
voted, nor tend to cast suspicion thereon, when the evidence
shows that, when the count was concluded by the election
officers, there were discrepancies between the tally sheets of
the different clerks of the election, which it was attempted to
reconcile by guessing at the result, and making changes
accordingly: Henderson v. Albright, 34 S. NV. Rep. 992.

The Supreme Court of the United States has lately held
that the question whether an extraditable offence has been
committed is a question of mixed law and fact, but
Extradition,
Judgment of chiefly of fact; and that therefore the judgment of a
Committing magistrate, rendered in good faith, that the accused
Magistrate

.

is guilty of the act charged, and that it constitutes
an extraditable crime, cannot be reviewed on the weight of
the evidence, and is final for the purposes of the preliminary
examination, unless palpably erroneous in law: Ornelas v.
Ruiz, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689.
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved has lately rendered a
very interesting decision in a most peculiar case: The Queen
v. Riley, [1896] I Q. B. 3o9. The defendant, who
Forgery,
Telegram
was a clerk in the head post-office at Manchester,

PROGRESS OF THE LAV.

had obtained from another peison permission to make bets in
his name with a certain firm of book-makers. On the day of
the Newcastle Handicap the defendant sent to the bookmakers a telegram placing a bet on a certain horse for that
race, which purported to have been handed in at another office
before the race was run, and thence transmitted to the head
office; but in reality the telegram was not handed in at the
other office at al!, but was sent by the defendant from the
head office after news had been received that the horse on
which the bet was placed had won the race.' The bookmakers, however, not knowing this, credited the third person
with the amount won at the current odds.
The defendant was indicted under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, § 38,
for obtaining certain money by means, of "a certain forged
instrument, to wit, a telegram; " and a majority of the court
held, in spite of the doubts expressed by the Chief Justice and
Justice Vaughan Williams, that the telegram was a forged
instrument within the meaning of the Act, and that the indictment was good.
It has been recently decided by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, that when a husband had purchased land for his
Husbandand wife, under an agreement with her that she should
Wife,
give a mortgage to a third person to secure the
Contracts
between,
husband in the repayment of the bond given by
Enforcement him for the price, and so avoid the Common-Law
in Equity
rule prohibiting contracts between husband arid
wife, equity would, give effect to the transaction, so as to
enforce the equitable lien of the husband on the land for
repayment of the purchase price paid by him: Eckepmeyer v.
Hoffineier, 34 S. W. Rep. 521.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently, in Shakman v. United States Credit System Co., 66 N. W. Rep. 528, inInsurance,
Credit,

vestigated and defined the legal status and inci-

dents of a peculiar form of a contract of assurance, by which the credit of a merchant's
customers is assured to him. The contract, called a "certificate
of guaranty" was in effect a guaranty of the merchant
Guaranty
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against losses from sales on credit reulting from the insolvency of customers, to be determined in a manner specifically
described; and was accordingly held to be a contract of
insurance, within Rev. Stat. Wis. §§ 1977, 1978, so a; to
make the agent who solicited it the agent of the insurer to
all intents and purposes. It was further held that when the
contract provided that the customer must be rated in Dun's,
and rated at not less than a specified sum, one who is the
agent of the insurer for the purpose of soliciting such insurance, transmitting applications, and collecting premiums, and
who receives pay therefor, has power to make an additional
agreement providing that if the customer is not rated in
Dun's, and is rated in Bradstreet's, the rating in the latter
shall be binding on the insurer; and that when the contract
provided that in calculating losses thee should not be
included therein any credit given exceeding a credit of thirty
per cent. on the lowest capital rating the customer was rated
at in the mercantile reports, if a larger credit than thirty per
cent. of the lowest capital rating was given the insured should
be allowed a credit of thirty per cent. of that rating, and the
excess only should be disallowed.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Claf~ln v.
United States Credit System Co., 43 N. E. Rep. 293, has also
held that a contract of this kind is a contract of insurance, and
that it is invalid in that State, as a species of insurance not authorized by its Insurance Act. (Stat. Mass. 1887, c. 214, § 78.)
In American Surety Co. v. Paidy, 72 Fed. Rep. 470, the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has recently
passed upon a number of questions arising under
Insurance,
a contract of fidelity insurance. The more imporFidelity
tant of these are as follows :
(i) The surety company executed and delivered to a bank
bond,
insuring the bank against loss by any act of fraud or
a
NoticeoLoss,

dishonesty of its cashier in connection with the

Reasonable
Time

duties of his office, or the duties to which, in the
bank's service, he might be subsequently appointed,

which should occur during the continuance of the bond, and
be discovered within six months thereafter, and within six
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months from the death, dismissal, or retirement of the cashier
from the service of the bank. The bond provided that the
surety company should be notified of " any act" of the
cashier which might involve a loss for which the company
would be responsible, "as soon. as pract-abtk after -the occurrence of such act shall have come to the knowledge" of the
bank, and it required proofs of loss to be furnished to the
surety company. The bank suspended payment, and passed
into the hands of a receiver, who afterward notified the surety
company of the discovery of the dishonest acts of the cashier,
furnished proofs of loss, and brought suit against the surety
company on the bond. The evidence on the trial as to the
time when the dishonest acts of the cashier were discovered
was conflicting, and it was accordingly held that the question
whether the required notice was given with reasonable promptness was for the jury.
(2) The terms of the bond did not require notice of
Notice of Suspicion suspicion of dishonest acts to be given.
(3)The services rendered by the cashier as such to the
receiver after the suspension of the bank, were none the less
rendered to the bank, and the surety company
ActsinService of Bank was not absolved from liability for acts discovered
more than six months from the date of suspension, but within
six months from the date of his resignation from the service of
the receiver.
(4)A proof of loss under the bond, which set forth with
reasonable plainness, and in a manner by which a person of
Interpretation ordinary intelligence could not be misled, that
of Proofs of
certain sums of money had been taken from the
Loss
bank by means of acts of the cashier, described
in the proof, was sufficient, though it failed to aver explicitly
that a loss had been caused to the bank.
(5)Prior to the issue of the bond sued on, the cashier and
president of the bank had conspired to rob it, and had been
Knowledge of engaged in fraudulent practices. When applicaOfficers of tion was made for the bond, the surety company
Act of Cashier,
Notice to
Bank

required a certificate from the bank of the
cashier's good character. This certificate was
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made by the president without any direct authority, so far as
appeared, from the board of directors, or any knowledge by
them that such a certificate was made or required. On these
facts, it was held that the president's knowledge of the dishonesty of the cashier was not to be imputed to the bank, so
as to make it responsible for the misrepresentations contained
in the certificate.
In another suit in the same court between the same parties, 72
Fed. Rep. 484, on a bond insuring the fidelity of the president of
Proofs of

Loss

the bank, it was held (i) That proofs of loss under a

bond of suretyship insuring an employer against

loss by the dishonesty of an employe are mercantile documents,
and are not to be tested by the same rules of interpretation as an
indictment, or even a pleading. They are only required to
contain a brief and general statement of the facts with substantial accuracy, truthfully informing the insurer how the
loss occurred, and not tending to mislead him either by
what they contain or what they, omit; and (2) That when
such a bond provides that certain statements and accounts
" of a loss, that
Prima Facie shall be "prima facie evidence
Evidence of expression is not necessarily confined to the conLoss
sideration of a claim by the insurer, before suit ;
and it is not error to instruct the jury, on the trial of an
action on such a bond, that the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case by offering in evidence the statements and
accounts referred to: See 34 A-.3. L. REG. & REV. N. S. 56o.
In a recent case the Supreme Court of Florida has ruled,
that since interest is not the mere incident of a debt, but cornInterest on
Unliquidated
Damages

pensation

for the use or detention

of money,

whenever it is ascertained that money ought to
have been paid at a particular time, whether in

satisfaction of a debt, or as a compensation for a breach of
duty, or for a failure to keep a contract, interest should be
allowed thereon : and therefore the modern rule in regard to
the allowance of interest on claims for unliquidated damages
is, that whenever a verdict liquidates a claim, and fixes it as
of a prior date, interest should follow from that date. This
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makes the running of interest begin at least with the issuing
of the writ : Sullivan v. .3cAfillan, 19 So. Rep. 340.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion which
fails lamentably as an argument, 1as recently decided that
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution
Interstate
does not affect the right of a State to prohibit the
Commerce,
ame
transportation outside of its limits of game killed
in the State; that the ownership of the wild game within the
limits of a State, so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the
State for the benefit of all its people in common; and that
therefore the police power residing in a State authorizes it to
forbid the killing of game within the State with intention to
procure its transportation beyond the State limits : Geer v.
Conneeticut, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6oo.
Mr. Justice FIELD and Mr. Justice HARLAN dissented.
In Owens v. AfcCloskey,, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693, it was lately
held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that since in
Pennsylvania a scire facias to revive a judgment is
Judgment,
regarded as a substitute for an action of debt on
Scire Facias
to Revive,
the judgment, and the judgment rendered thereon
Effect

is quod reenperet,instead of a mere award of execution, a judgment so revived in Pennsylvania, without service or
appearance, has no binding force as against a defendant who
resides in another State; and that the revival of a judgment by
scirefacias,for purposes of execution, on two returns of nii,
operates merely to keep in force the local lien, and does not
stop the running of the statute of limitations in another State,
where the defendant resides.
If a father takes his child of tender years out of the State,
with its consent and with the consent of its mother, to whom
Kidnapping, its custody had been awarded in divorce proceedorder tha
Takingof
t the child may not be present at
ings, in
Child by
Father
a criminal trial in which it had been subpoenaed as
a witness, he is not guilty of kidnapping: John v. State,
(Supreme Court of Wyoming,) 44 Pac. Rep. 5I.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recently laid down
several interesting rules of law arising from the relation of
landlord and tenant, as follows:
Landlord
and Tenant,
(I) That one who enters upon lands as the
Tax title,
Adverse
Possession,
Dower
Interest

tenant of the grantee of a dower interest, and
agrees to redeem the lands from a prior tax sale

to the State, cannot acquire title by purchase
from the State, but that such a purchase becomes a redemption
in favor of his landlord;
(2) That in such a case the abandonment of the dower
interest by the grantee thereof does not operate to make what
had been as to her a redemption a purchase by the tenant,
and make him an owner thenceforth in adverse possession
against the dowress, or her heirs who were owners in fee of the
reversion, without notice to them of his claim of title ; and
(3) That one who is in possession of lands as tenant of a
grantee of a dower interest therein becomes, after the death of
the dowress, a tenant at sufferance of the owners of the
reversion ; and if he allows the lands to be sold for taxes, he
cannot afterwards purchase them, and set up the title against
the heirs, without notice: Lyebrook v. Hall, 19 So. Rep. 348.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has lately
held. that it is not error to charge the jury, in an action
for a libel published in a newspaper, that the
Libel,
Newspapers,
greater extent of circulation makes the libel of a
Degree of Care journalist more damaging, and imposes special
duties as to care to prevent the risk of such mischief, proportionate to the peril: Enquirer Co. v.Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep. 443.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has recently
decided a novel question, in the law of libel. It holds that
since a cause of action for libel, founded upon
Statements in
publications made in the course of judicial proJudicial
Proceedings, ceedings, does not accrue until the final deterLimitation
mination, in favor of the party libeled,
of the
proceedings in which the publication is made, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run against that cause of action
until then : .0fastersonv. Brozn, 72 Fed. Rep. 136.
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An ordinance of a municipal corporation, which provided
that " no person shall on any street or public place, or on land
adjacent thereto, sing or recite any profane or
Municipal
Corporations, obscene song or ballad, or use any profane or
Ordinances,

Reasonableness

obscene language," was recently held by the
Queen's Bench Division to be invalid, since, even

if the words " or on land adjacent thereto," which were clearly
too wide, were stricken out, it would still be unreasonable
because it did not contain any- words importing that the act
must be done so as to cause annoyance: Sirickland v. Hayes,
[1896] 1 Q. B. 290.
There is good reason to suppose that if the case rested
wholly on the latter ground, it would be reversed by the Court
of Appeal, if carried there ; for, despite the rejection of that
claim by the judges who heard the appeal from the justices,
there would seem to be no question but that the use of profane
or obscene language necessarily implies annoyance.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Dakota, when a valid motion is made and seconded at
a meeting of a board at which all the members are
Parliamentary
present, but the chairman refuses to put it, on the
Law,
Refusal of ground that it is illegal,
it may be put by the one
2
Chairman to
put ,Motion,
who made the motion; and if it receives the vote
power of
of a majority of those present, it will be properly
Mleeting

carried, whether the others vote or not. Accordingly, motions to remove an officer, to appoint another, and to
approve the bond of the latter, made, put and carried in this
way, will be effectual, if the power of doing the acts moved
resides in the board: State v. Archibald,66 N. V7. Rep. 234.
In Thwaites v. Coulthwaite, [1896] I Ch. 496, Justice
Chitty, of the Chancery Division of England, has lately held,
Partnership, that since the fact that one partner has been guilty
of illegal acts in the conduct of the partnership
Action for
Account,
business is no defence to an action for account by
Illegal
Business,
Bookmaking

the other partner, when the objects of the partnership were not illegal, and the innocent partner

intended at the time of entering into the partnership that it
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should be carried on lawfully; and since a bookmaking and
betting business can be carried on without contravening the
Betting Act of 1853 (i6 & i7 Vict. c. 119,) and the plaintiff,
who was a partner in such a business, contemplated at the
time he entered into the partnership that it would be carried
on in the usual way ; the fact that the defendant acted illegally
was immaterial, and the plaintiff was entitled to an account.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently ruled, that since
the office of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a
declaration upon the facts as alleged therein, its
Pleading,
Demurrer
scope cannot be so extended by an agreed statement of facts which neither amends nor purports to amend the
declaration, as to cover questions that might arise upon a
motion for nonsuit upon a state of facts appearing otherwise
than by the declaration Constitution Pub/is/hg Co. v. Steg-all,
24 S. E. Rep. 33.
It is not a violation of a constitutional provision (Const.
Tenn. Art. i, § 6,) that the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, to compel the plaintiff, in a suit for
Practice,
Trial,
damages for the death of his intestate, to join in
Demurrer to
a demurrer to the evidence, when the evidence is
Evidence,
Constitutional conceded to be true, and all legitimate and reaLaw

sonable inferences that may be drawn from it are
admitted ; and further, such action is not in violation of a
provision (Const. Tenn. Art. 6, , 9.) that judges shall not
charge juries with respect to matters of fact: Hopkins v.
Xas/iville, C. & St. L. Ry., 34 S. W. Rep. 1029.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of
England, a municipal corporation owes to the public a duty to
Principaland so construct its sewers as not to injure the gasAgent,
mains or other underground conveniences ; that it
Independent
Contractor,
Liability for
Breach of
Duty

will be responsible. to any one injured in consequence of a breach of this duty, though the performance of it has been delegated to an independent
contractor ; and consequently that if a gas-main is broken by
the negligence of the contractor in executing the work, and
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an explosion takes place in a private house, because of the
escape of the gas fron the broken main, the municipality will
be liable, the damages not being too remote: Hardakei- v.
-11c District Council, [1896 ] 1 Q. B. 335.
The nature and incidents of the liability of the several
sureties upon an aggregate bond, i. e., one in which the
principal is bound in a sum, for portions of
Principal
which only the several sureties are separately
and Surety
Several

Bond,
Actions,
Parties,
Contribution

bound, has lately been investigated by the Supreme
Court of New York, at Special Term for New

York County, in Tozc'O" v. Schd, 37 N. Y. Suppl.
879. It decided
(i) That a separate action may be maintained against each
of the sureties on such a bond on his separate liability, without
joining the other sureties as defendants;
(2) That the recovery against a surety on such a bond is
not limited to a proportionate amount of the total default, but
to the penal sum for which he binds himself; and
(3)That a surety who is compelled to pay more than his
just proportion of the default is entitled to contribution from
the others.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Spa/ding v.
16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63 1, has passed upon the question of the
maliciously done
Public Officer, liability of a public officer for acts
of
his office. The
of
the
duties
in
the
discharge
Liability for
Official Acts plaintiff alleged that Mr. Vilas, then Postmaster-

Vi/as,

General, had acted maliciously in sending warrants for claims
put in his hands for collection to the claimants themselves,
instead of paying them to him in order that he might deduct his
fees therefrom: in consequence of which many of these fees
were not received by him, The court held that he could not
recover, since the rule which exonerites a judicial officer from
liability for official acts extends by analogy to the acts of all
public officers. This is tersely put by Mr. Justice Harlan:
"We are of opinion that the same general considerations of public
policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior
jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from acts done
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by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions
apply to a large extent to official communications made by heads of
executive departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed
upon them by law. The interests of the people require that due protection be accorded to them in respect of their official acts. As in the case
of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinction between action taken by
the head of a department in reference to matters which are manifestly
or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision. Whatever difficulty may arise in applying these principles to
particular cases, in which the rights of the citizen may have been materially impaired by the inconsiderate or wrongful action of the head of a
department, it is clear-and the present case requires nothing more to be
determined-that he cannot be held liable to a civil suit for damages on
account of official communications made by him pursuant to an Act of
Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority, by reason of
any personal motive that might be alleged to have prompted his action ;
for personal motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized official conduct. In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an executive department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not
be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint. He may have legal
authority to act, but he may have such large discretion in the premises
that it will not always be his absolute duty to exercise the authority with
which he is invested. But if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation of a suit against him personally for damages,
even if the circumstances show that lie is not disagreeably impressed by
the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular individuals. In the present case, as we have found, the defendant, in issuing
the circular in question, did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line
of his duty, as Postmaster-General. The motive that impelled him to
do that of which the plaintiff complains is, therefore, wholly immaterial.
If we were to hold that the demurrer admitted, for the purposes of the
trial, that the defendant acted maliciously, that could not change the
law. "

According to a recent decision of the High Court of Justice of the Province of Ontario, a person who posts a letter
Railroads,

on a mail car attached to a train abo'ut to start,
the car is furnished under instructions

Licensee

post-office department, with a slit for
posting letters, is a mere licensee, the invitation to

Mail Car,
although
Invitation to
Post Letters, from the

post, if any, being the invitation of the post-office department,
and not of the railroad company: and therefore one who, in
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attempting to post a letter on a moving train, trips over a
peg placed in the ground by the company, and is injured,
cannot recover: Spcncer v. Grand Trunk Ry. CO., 32 Can. L.
J. 235.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i, has held,
in a recent case, (I) That when there is a dispute over the
Religious
rights of contending factions of an unincorporated
Societies,
church to the use of the church property, an
Property
Rights,
injunction will lie at the suit of the faction entitled
Injunction
to the property to restrain trespasses thereon by
the other faction ; (2) That the deacons or trustees of an
unincorporated church, governed wholly through its congregation, who are authorized as the constituted authority of the
church to control the use of its property, conveyed to trustees
in trust for the church, have authority to exclude those members who refuse to recognize the authority of the regular
organization ; and (3) That if members of the congregation
are improperly excluded by the deacons from the use of the
church property, they must apply to the courts for redress, or
appeal to the congregation. They cannot resort to acts of'
trespass to gain entrance to the church: Fuibrzgi tv. Higginhot/tan, 34 S. W. Rep. 875.
In Cincinnati St. Ry. Ca. v. Sneli, 43 N. E. Rep. 207, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has very clearly defined the respective
Street
rights and duties of vehicles and foot-passengers
Railroads,
at a street crossing. In that case the plaintiff, after
Crossings,
Stop, Look
properly alighting from an cast-bound car on the
and Listen,
off side, which made it necessary for him to cross
Alighting
Passengers
both tracks in order to reach his destination,
started to cross them just behind the car from which he had
alighted, and, as he stepped on the other track, was struck
and injured by a west-bound car, which was running at an,
improper rate of speed, and came up without warning. The
various principles applicable to these facts were fully discussed
by the court, and laid down as follows :
(I) The introduction of new forms of vehicles and of new
motive power on street railways has not impaired the right of
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foot passengers to safe passage at street crossings. It is the
duty of drivers of vehicles of all sorts, whether wagons, bicycles, or cars, to so regulate their speed, and give such warning of their approach, at whatever cost of pains and trouble
on their part, as that foot passengers, using ordinary care.
may, in the absence of unavoidable accident, cross in safety
(2) That a person about to cross the track of a street rail-way at a street crossing is bound to exercise a degree of care
proportioned to the danger to be avoided, and the consequences which may result firom the want of it, according to
the particular circumstances ; but ordinar care does not
require that he should anticipate negligence on the part of
those who operate the railway, nor that he should always look
in both directions for the approach of a car; for whether or not
a failure to look is negligence depends entirely on the attendant circumstances ; and
(3) That when a street-railway company operating a double
line of track discharges a passenger at a street crossing, having reason to know that that passenger must cross its tracks
in order to reach his destination, it is the duty of the company
to pay due regard to the rights of the passenger while on the
crossing, and to so regulate the speed of its cars, and give
such warning of their approach, as will reasonably protect the
passenger from injury. An omission to do this is negligence,
and a person injured by reason thereof has a cause of
action against the company, unless barred by contributory
negligence.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently held, that a
Sunday aws, social club comes within the prohibition of its
SocialClub Sunday law, requiring that stores, shops, groceries and saloons be closed on Sunday: State v. Gdi, 19
So. Rep. 468.
A regulation of a telegraph company that its messenger
boy, sent to receive a telegram for transmission, shall be
deemed the agent of the sender, is invalid; and
Telegraph
Companies,
even if valid, it is waived by the company wvlhen,
Regulations on receiving a telegram requesting an answer, it
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'directs the messenger boy who delivers the telegram to wait
for a reply: Wills v. Postal Telcgraplh Cable Co., (Supreme
-Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,)
37 N. Y. SuppI. 933.
In an action for damages for maliciously inducing persons
Tort,

Inducing
Breach of
Contract,

Damages

to break their business contracts with the plaintiff,
the latter is not required to prove specific damage;
it is enough if he proves facts from which it may
be properly inferred that some damage must result

toi the plaintiff from the defendant's wrongful acts : i-change
Tcl:gra-ph Co., Ltd. v. Gr,'go;r, & Co., [t896] I Q. B. 147,
The Court of Appeal of England has lately passed upon an
interesting question of law in regard to the effect of the resigof a voluntary association,
Voluntary,- nation of a member
d poe~o
Association, A voluntary trade protection society had been
Membership, formed, whose members became such by election,
Resignation
and paid an annual subscription,
in return for
which they were entitled to legal assistance for the purposes
of their trade, and to some other benefits. By the rules the
members incurred no obligations beyond the payment of their
subscriptions. These rules contained no provision as to the
retirement or expulsion of members. The plaintiff, one of the
members, after being such for over a year, wrote a letter
to the governing body of the society, stating that he desired
to withdraw his name as a member. No reply was sent him,
and a month later, having changed his mind and desiring to
continue as a member, he wrote to the chairman of the society,
requesting him to withdraw his resignation. In reply to this
the secretary of the society wrote him that the committee had
unanimously resolved to accept his resignation. After further
correspondence, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the committee from excluding him from membership.
The court held, reversing the decision of Justice Kekewich,
that in such a society a member could retire at any time
without the consent of the others; that the plaintiff ceased to
be a member so soon as the society received the letter stating
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his wish to retire, without the necessity of an acceptance of his
resignation by the society ; that he could not withdraw his
resignation before acceptance; and that he could not become
a member of the society again without a re-eiection ; Finch v.
Oakc, [18 9 6] 1 Ch. 409.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has recently rendered
a very sensible decision to the effect that if the name of a
witness is signed
to the execution of a will by
Z
Will,
Attestation, another,
at the witness's request, and in her
%%ging of presence and that of the testator, the attestation
Name by
is sufficient, though the person whose name is
Another
signed as a witness does not touch
the pen;
provided that the witness, though able to write, is temporarily
so far incapacitated that she writes with difficulty, and is in
the habit of using an amanuensis: In re C'razford's Will, 24
S. E. Rep. 69.
A devise to the testator's wife of all his property, to be
disposed of by her among his children as she may think best,
the
Construction, vests a life estate in her, with power to divide
Exercise
land between his children as she thinks best; but,
of Power
as a power of appointment must be exercised for
the benefit of the parties entitled thereto, and not with a view
of benefiting the donee of the power, the widow cannot in such
a case convey to one of the children a portion greater than
those granted to the other children, on condition that that
child should assume the payment of her debts, and provide
for her and her second husband during their lives: Dcgman v.
Degman, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 34 S. WV.Rep. 523.
According to a recent decision of Justice North, of the
Chancery Division, a clause in a will that directs the trustees
Construction, to pay "to each man who shall have been in my
Legacy
employ over ten years," a certain sum for each
year's service beyond the ten years, applies to one who had
been in the employ of the testator for fifteen years, but had left
it before the date of the will, and was not in his employ at the
time of his death : In re Sharland, [ 189 6] I Ch. 5 17.
Ardemus S'tewart.

